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 As Whitehead once intimated, philosophers tend to speak in half-truths, 
though very few do us the courtesy of admitting it (cf.  Whitehead 1956 , 
14). Fortunately for us, the Daoist thinker known as Zhuangzi is one of 
those few. As I hope to show, his philosophy could be a boon to Western 
ethics because it challenges two long-standing metaethical assumptions. 
The first is the supposed link between moral realism and moral cogni-
tivism, i.e., the idea that “the cognitivism/non-cognitivism and realism/
anti-realism distinctions in metaethics are really just two different ways 
of marking one and the same distinction” ( Adams 2014 , 39). But what 
if someone deems moral notions unevaluable in terms of propositional, 
justified true belief  and yet sees them as nonetheless beholden to reality? 
What if there are mind-independent norms that can be felt/intuited? Is 
such a non-cognitivist moral realism plausible? 1 I will suggest it is, if one 
is willing to adopt a non-propositional account of moral beliefs like the 
one found in the text associated with Zhuangzi and his followers. 2 
 The alleged link between cognitivism and realism seems to underwrite 
a second assumption about moral skill – i.e., if there could be something 
like true moral expertise, it must require “ articulacy in explanation , the 
ability to convey why what is done is done” ( Annas 2011 , 20). 3 Since 
Socrates, virtue has often been thought to imply the ability to build justi-
fied true beliefs about the rational principles that motivate action. And so, 
articulate ‘skill’ gets contrasted with dumb ‘knack’; if one has the ( technē ) 
of an expert, one must be able to give an account ( logos ) of what one is 
doing. And so, as the story goes, no account, no expertise. 4 But what if 
one believes the  absence of rational thought is a defining characteristic 
of expertise? 5 Once more, the  Zhuangzi may be of service, as it presents 
inarticulate ‘knack’ as precisely what qualifies someone as a sage who has 
discovered ‘the secret of nourishing life’. It is  full of stories about various 
sorts of skillful artisans, which, following Joseph  Needham (1954 ), have 
come to be known as the ‘knack passages’ and suggest “that wonderful 
skills cannot be taught or transferred, but are attainable by minute con-
centration on the Tao running through natural objects of all kinds” (Ibid., 
121). I will suggest the constellation of virtues these passages illustrate 
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offers us a unique theory of moral expertise built on a notion of emergent 
normativity in mutual co-adjustment with an ever-changing world. 
 The  Zhuangzi , however, is notoriously difficult to pin down, and its 
obscurity has been well documented in recent literature. I will build on 
key passages from the text as well as recent scholarship focusing on Dao-
ist praxeology in order to show that the  Zhuangzi offers something of a 
moral philosophy built on the seemingly paradoxical notions of  ineffable 
moral truths and  non-transferable moral knack . 6 While such entities may 
not be accessible as objects of knowledge, the text nonetheless demon-
strates that they  are practicable and that much can be communicated 
 about them. What is interesting about the  Zhuangzi , in this regard, is 
how it undermines the assumed distinction between an agent and the 
world by placing the explanatory grounds for action as much in the 
world as in the agent. So if the  Zhuangzi’s presentation of knack is coher-
ently prescriptive, perhaps something like moral expertise, understood in 
terms of a “multi-stranded, domain limited” field of experts, is plausible 
( Jones and Schroeter 2012 ). 
 The interpretation I am attempting here is somewhat unorthodox, as 
most Anglophone scholars tend to view Zhuangzi as some sort of mys-
tic, relativist, or skeptic. Suffice it to say, I do not  entirely disagree with 
such readings, which is to say I do not  exactly agree. First, if Zhuangzi 
really  was a mystic, he appears to have been of the holistic variety that 
sees an immanent continuity in the totality of nature. But this is a posi-
tion that looks compatible with realism. Second, if the text promotes 
a brand of relativism, it is  not likely the kind that would make Hitler 
and Gandhi moral equivalents (cf.  Allinson 2015 ) but instead a plural-
istic acknowledgment of the efficacy of different perspectives (cf.  Wong 
2006 ). Such perspectivalism leads to the insight that some values might 
be multiply realizable, not “that all values exist on the same axiological 
plane” ( Allinson 2015 , 272). Third, if something like skepticism can be 
found in his writings, his doubts appear aimed mainly at the philosophi-
cal methods of his contemporaries. Simply put, there is reason to believe 
Zhuangzi was neither a transcendental mystic, a jejune subjectivist, nor 
a  moral skeptic. 
 For three decades now, Western commentaries on the  Zhuangzi have 
largely been focused on epistemological issues. 7 The central interpretive 
question seems to boil down to accounting for the ineffability that it 
advances. Yet the traditional mystical, subjectivist, and skeptical readings 
do not square with what the text has to say about goblet words or the 
other  sānyán . This may be due to the fact that the  sānyán are never explic-
itly referenced in the inner chapters of the text and almost undoubtedly 
were named much later by authors from either the ‘School of Zhuang’ 
or ‘Huang-Lao’ sects. 8 Nonetheless, there are numerous examples of the 
 sānyán rhetorical styles in the inner chapters and even the passages of 
the  Zhuangzi that have figured  most prominently in recent scholarship 
offer insight into a goblet word strategy. 
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 Before turning my attention to the goblet words themselves, some prelimi-
nary remarks may be necessary about the notion of truth as it appears in the 
 Zhuangzi . One of the more salient features of a Zhuangzian non-cognitive 
moral realism would have to be a conception of truth largely unfamiliar 
to the Western philosophical tradition insofar as it is non-propositional. 
In fact, many comparativists agree that pre-Qin thought (before 221 BCE) 
either operated without the true/false distinction or at least held it to be 
philosophically unimportant (e.g.,  Munro 1969 ;  Hansen 1985 ). But this 
should not imply that works like the  Zhuangzi operate completely detached 
from the real world, only that the way such texts present their doctrines 
looks very different from that with which we are accustomed. In the case of 
the  Zhuangzi , I should like to introduce the phrase ‘tipping toward truth’ to 
characterize its distinctively metaphorical moral discourse. 
 One character frequently appearing in English translations as ‘truth’ is 
 真 ( zhēn ). It has come to mean ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ in modern usage, but 
its usage in the  Zhuangzi is more multifarious. Interestingly, the character 
appears only three times in the  Laozi and not at all in Confucius or Mencius, 
which may indicate it was a Daoist neologism employed as a foil to Confu-
cian concepts ( Moeller and D’Ambrosio 2017 ). 9 For instance, in the 31st 
chapter there is a story about a fisherman who questions Confucius and his 
students about their philosophy. After hearing Confucius’s prized benevo-
lence and ritual propriety over all else, the fisherman laughs and says, 
 仁則仁矣，恐不免其身，苦心勞形以危其真。嗚乎，遠哉其分於道也 . 
 Benevolence schmenevolence! I fear he won’t get out of this alive. All 
this effort and trouble just to endanger truth [ zhēn ]. Phew! He’s far 
away and totally cut off from the  Dào ! 
 [Zhuangzi, Ch. 31] 10 
 After a lengthy discussion, an exasperated Confucius finally asks what 
the old man means by ‘truth’. In his response, the fisherman explains 
that  zhēn consists in sincerity, but it is a sincerity toward one’s own inner 
nature, out of which filiality, kindness, appropriateness, loyalty, and hon-
esty all grow. The fisherman goes on to explain that, 
 禮者 ,  世俗之所為也 ;  真者，所以受於天也，自然不可易也 .  故聖人法
天貴真，不拘於俗 . 
 Those rites [that Confucius prized] were made up by the vulgar; 
truth is what is received from nature [ tīan ]. Its spontaneity can’t be 
changed. That’s why the sage prizes the patterns of nature [ fă tīan ] as 
truth, and isn’t cramped by convention. 
 [ Zhuangzi , Ch. 31] 
 The concept of  zhēn looks like a direct challenge to the Confucian ethical 
system. The author(s) of the  Zhuangzi viewed the Confucian emphasis on 
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ritual propriety and benevolence as officious and too easily corruptible. The 
‘truth’ they sought to recover was not a propositional truth of sentences 
but rather “the natural state of a thing and what it is natural to do, or, 
simply, what is natural” ( Chong 2011 , 324). This is best illustrated in the 
way  zhēn is contrasted with the artifice of  wéi (‘human effort/action’) in the 
 Qíwùlùn chapter. 11 As those familiar with Daoist thought will recognize, 
one of that chapter’s central ideas is the importance of  wúwéi , often trans-
lated as nonaction. Thus the kind of truth toward which Zhuangzi’s goblet 
words tip is meant to be something fluid, dynamic, and ever-changing – 
something realized only through an effortless, spontaneous  praxis . 
 1. Goblet Words: Tipping Toward Truth 
 Translators have long noted the unique challenges of rendering Zhuang-
zi’s deeply poetic and metaphorical style into English. 12 He employed the 
language of his day in ways that had never been seen and was thus able 
to create “semantic paradoxes, infinite regresses, irony, wordplay, and 
fables” that made it possible to “hint at certain things . . . without being 
forced (logically) to assert or to adhere to anything” ( Chong 2006 , 382). 
This is noteworthy because if one is to locate in his view anything like 
a cognitively inaccessible moral ‘real’, i.e., a mind-independent norm, it 
obviously  could not be stated directly . 
 One major theme in the text is the limitation of language in capturing 
reality. Several of its chapters are devoted to the subject – the most promi-
nent among them being the second of the ‘inner’ chapters, the  Qíwùlùn . 
But it is in the 27th chapter, entitled  Yùyán (often translated simply as 
‘Metaphorical Words’), that the text offers an explicit account of the lan-
guage it employs. It refers to its language as  yùyán [ 寓言 ],  zhòngyán [ 重言 ], 
and  zhīyán [ 卮言 ], which might be translated, respectively, as ‘attributed 
words’, ‘endorsed words’, and ‘goblet words’. 13 The  yùyán are ‘attributed’ 
in two senses. On one hand, they mock the Confucian rhetorical strategy 
of citing well-known texts to support an idea. On the other hand, they ref-
erence the way a metaphor can often point to the  attributes of something 
else not obviously related. Similarly, the  zhòngyán can be seen as a parody 
of the flowery language of the elders that the Confucians often endorsed 
in their rhetoric. The  Zhuangzi frequently puts its  zhòngyán in the mouths 
of the bizarre and/or repugnant to great effect. In fact, both the  yùyán and 
the  zhòngyán are sometimes treated as subspecies of the  zhīyán , or goblet 
words, since the text makes a point to say how often each appears: 
 寓言十九，重言十七，卮言日出，和以天倪 .  寓言十九，藉外論之  . . . 
 重言十七，所以已言也，是為耆艾 . . .  卮言日出，和以天倪，因以
曼衍，所以窮年 . 
 Yùyán are nine of ten.  Zhòngyán are seven of ten.  Zhīyán circulate daily 
and harmonize nature’s cycles. The  yùyán that comprise nine of ten pay 
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tribute to the sayings of others. . . . The  zhòngyán that comprise seven 
of ten are intended to end disputes, for these are the words of revered 
elders. . . . The  zhīyán that circulate daily and harmonize nature’s cycles 
effuse through the region and thoroughly extend the years. 
 [ Zhuangzi , Ch. 27] 
 This tripartite discourse, called the  sānyán [ 三言 ] by later thinkers, devel-
oped as a comedic cure for an era that had become “blinkered by the 
darkness of [Confucian and Mohist] ‘chop logic’” ( Lee 2000 , 530). The 
 Zhuangzi’s advice in such a time was to follow the  dào , which 
 all things unerringly follow . . . except that inveterate analyser and 
wordmonger man, who misses it by sticking rigidly to the verbally 
formulated codes which [those] other philosophical schools present 
as ‘the Way of the sage’ or the ‘Way of the former kings’. 
 ( Graham 2001 , 7) 
 In this vein, the  Zhuangzi’s sānyán are at once satirical  and instructive. 
 The most detailed description of the goblet words can be found in the 
final chapter of the text. It reads: 
 以天下為沈濁 ,  不可與莊語 ;  以卮言為曼衍 . . .  其書雖瑰瑋而連 犿 無
傷也 ,  其辭雖參差而諔詭可觀 .  彼其充實不可以已 . 
 Since the whole world acts as if mired in a bog, Zhuangzi could not 
speak directly. So he used ‘goblet words’ [ zhīyán ] to effuse mean-
ing . . . Though his writings seem fantastically gaudy and howlishly 
entertaining, no harm comes from them. Even though they seem mere 
folly they are worth observing, for through them he  brings forth ever-
cascading truths . 
 [ Zhuangzi , Ch. 33] 14 
 The  zhīyán name is a reference to an ancient irrigation vessel known as the 
 qīqí [ 欹器 ], which tipped and spilled its contents once it reached capacity 
( Fried 2007 ). Like that ancient practical joke known as the Pythagorean 
cup, Zhuangzi’s goblet words are drained of their content once their use-
fulness has been exceeded. As the text states elsewhere: 
 荃者所以在魚，得魚而忘荃 ;  蹄者所以在兔，得兔而忘蹄；言者所以
在意，得意而忘言。吾安得忘言之人而與之言哉 ? 
 Traps are for fish; once the fish is caught, the trap can be forgotten. 
Snares are for rabbits; once the rabbit is caught, the snare can be 
forgotten. Words are for meaning; once the meaning is caught, the 
words can be forgotten. Where can I find someone who has forgotten 
words so I may have a word with him? 
 [ Zhuangzi , Ch. 26] 
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 Thus, the  Zhuangzi admits to employing words as tools, bound to be dis-
missed as soon as one has captured their meaning. Those (like the Confu-
cians and Mohists) who become enamored with words are rather like a 
traveler who cannot disembark from the ship. What the  Zhuangzi seems 
to suggest is that it is better to allow for semantic properties to shift so 
one can ‘forget’ the vessel and focus on the journey. Simply put, his goblet 
words are intentionally open-ended. 15 
 So, what should be made of the text’s numerous metaphors? What does 
it mean to say they ‘tip toward truth’? Interpreters have a few options 
available to them. Some have chosen to see Zhuangzi’s style as the mus-
ings of a metaphysical mystic committed to a quasi-religious ineffability 
( Chan 1963 ;  Watson 1968 ;  Creel 1970 ;  Roth 2000 ). Others tend to view 
his writings through the lens of classical Western skepticism and relativ-
ism (Wong 1984; Hansen 1992;  Eno 1996 ;  Kjellberg and Ivanhoe 1996 ). 
However, most mystical interpretations invoke a notion of ineffability 
wherein some anointed class of people gain access to esoteric, transcen-
dent truths through some  special  aptitude . On the other hand, skepti-
cal readings usually depend, rather conversely, on a universal  ineptitude 
to do so ( Kukla 2004 ). Both readings are problematic. As shall become 
clearer later, it is more likely that Zhuangzi saw sagehood and the moral 
lessons it provided as multiply realizable and quite commonplace, i.e., as 
‘nothing special’. 
 Recent literature has treated Zhuangzi’s use of metaphor along dif-
ferent lines – focusing more on existential and normative concerns. One 
camp tends to see Zhuangzi’s main goal as one of intellectual liberation. 
For instance, Robert Allinson has called it “transcendent freedom” – in 
a more Kantian than religious sense – and Kim-chong Chong refers to it 
as freedom from epistemic “boundedness” ( Chong 2006 ;  Allinson 2015 ). 
Both reject the Davidsonian take on metaphor and agree there is at least 
some cognitive content that is lost in paraphrase, though each is decid-
edly murky on the details. 16 
 Alternatively, as Youru Wang has noted, “the philosophical notion 
of metaphor implied in the  Zhuangzi is quite different from the philo-
sophical conception of metaphor in Western metaphysics .  .  . there 
is no fixed meaning behind a metaphor”, no “notion of the proper 
meaning of words and [no] separation between the sensible and the 
intelligible” (Y.  Wang 2004 , 203). On his view, the author(s) of the 
text employed a strategy of “indirect communication”, which “consid-
ers meaning to be open-ended and indeterminate” (Ibid., 195). In this 
way, the  Zhuangzi ’s use of metaphor seems to dissolve the distinction 
between cognitive and non-cognitive content on which most Western 
commentaries have been built. And this links up nicely with Edward’s 
Slingerland’s research ( 2014 ) on the Daoist notion of spontaneity, or 
 zìrán , which he connects to neuro-scientific theories like Damasio’s 
somatic marker hypothesis: 
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 There is now general agreement that human thought is characterized 
by two distinct systems that have very different characteristics. The 
first and most important of these (tacit, hot cognition, or “System 1”) 
is fast, automatic, effortless, and mostly unconscious, corresponding 
roughly to what we think of as “the body” and what Zhuangzi calls 
the “Heavenly mechanism.” The second (explicit, cold cognition, or 
“System 2”) is slow, deliberate, effortful, and conscious, correspond-
ing roughly to our “mind” – that is, our conscious, verbal selves. 
 (Ibid., 27) 
 Perhaps access to what Zhuangzi deemed “true” requires calming the 
reflective mind in order to employ the reflexivity of the body. In this 
way, Zhuangzi’s goblet words, much like a Zen koan, ‘tip toward truth’ 
while remaining empty of any set content. Their meaning must be  felt and 
whatever one finds there swells from what one has already brought with 
them. But, what does it mean to call such truths ‘ever-cascading’ [ chōng 
shí  充實 ]? 17 In order to flesh that out, something must be said about the 
comingling of cosmology and morality in pre-Qin China. 
 2. Ever-Cascading Truths and Transformation 
 Many scholars have made reference to the continuity between humanity 
and nature found within the pages of the Chinese classics. Tu Wei-ming 
summed it up best when he described the Chinese vision as “all modali-
ties of being organically connected .  .  . integral parts of a continuous 
process of cosmic transformation” ( Tu 1989 , 75). As he put it, to under-
stand this point is to realize that “we are consanguineous with nature. 
But as humans, we must make ourselves worthy of such a relationship”, 
through our own transformations and attunement with the processes of 
nature (Ibid., 78). 
 Attunement with nature is another major theme in the  Zhuangzi . While 
it may be tempting to see this as a mystical and spiritually charged moral 
notion, there is good reason to see it more naturalistically. J.H. Lee calls 
it a “poetics of normativity”, which emphasizes the use of metaphorical 
language in the text and “rests on the Daoist understanding of the Way 
( Dào ) as the ultimate source of normativity” ( Lee 2014 , 43). On this view, 
the language of the  Zhuangzi is implicitly normative precisely because 
it  is poetic, as in the original sense of the Greek  poiesis – or ‘bringing 
forth’ – which produces in the sage both a heightened awareness ( míng ) 
 and responsiveness ( yìng ) described as mirroring “the workings of the 
Way itself in Nature” (Ibid.). This is an aspect of Zhuangzi’s thought that 
often strikes Western philosophers as very strange. But Zhuangzi inher-
ited an alternate view of human action that did not rely on a Platonic psy-
chology, wherein the mind is a set of representations, truth is measured 
according to correspondence, and knowledge acquisition is considered a 
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passive affair. In this ‘intellectualist’ psychology, there is a sharp contrast 
between inner and outer (agent and world) and the causal arrows of 
experience tend to be drawn from the external world of ‘objects’ toward 
an internal, knowing ‘subject’. Intelligent action, then, is thought to origi-
nate in the mind and to be oriented toward the external world. By con-
trast, Zhuangzi’s ‘poetics of normativity’ imply that thoughtful human 
actions can shape nature just as much as nature shapes human action 
and thought. In other words, for someone like Zhuangzi, what we might 
call ‘thinking’ is not physically delimited by our brains or even our bod-
ies, but instead is found in a dynamic interplay and continuity between 
humanity and nature, or, as Lee puts it elsewhere (borrowing the words 
of Henry James) it is to be “finely aware and richly responsible” ( Lee 
2000 ,  2014 ). 
 These lines of thought help explain why the  Qíwùlùn chapter – which 
features the lengthiest discussion of language in the text – might begin 
with a dialogue regarding attunement between the pipes of humanity, 
earth, and nature [ 人 ;  地 ;  天 ] and end with an allegory in which Zhuangzi 
dreamt he was a butterfly and learned a lesson about the ever-changing 
cosmos. The concluding lines of this chapter read: “Between Zhou and a 
butterfly there is certainly some difference. This is called transformation 
of things [ wùhuà ]”. This is important as it suggests the point of the but-
terfly story is not to advance some skeptical thesis –  à la the Cartesian 
dream argument – but rather to illustrate the dynamic holism of the  dào . 
From a broader perspective, the fleeting distinctions between small things 
like people and butterflies should indicate  fluidity in the transformation 
of nature. 
 For Zhuangzi, human beings, like the other myriad things of the world, 
are points of focus ( dé  德 ), which are inextricably linked to the  field 
of nature. This field is both functionally constitutive of its foci and the 
sum total of such functioning.  Dào , then, might be understood as a sort 
of tapestry, rewoven constantly,  of which the pattern is not some pre-
ordained  telos but rather an emergent property, and  in which the vari-
ous threads are  relations among the pattern’s constituents. 18 This is the 
 Zhuangzi’s chosen metaphor for describing those elders who the Confu-
cians and Mohists revered and that he lampooned in his  zhòngyán style 
of goblet words: 
 Grown old! And never went through the  warp and  woof from root to 
tip as befitting an “elder,” has neither progressed nor is an advanced 
elder nor a person of dao, and thus is a stale obsolete oldster. 
 (tr.  Morrow 2016 , 184, emphasis added) 
 The prescription, then, is one of self-growth, or transformation, not some 
 ab extra enlightenment. Both may be a kind of transcendence but only 
the former stays connected to the transformation of the natural realm. 
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 The butterfly passage calls for a more fluid kind of discourse than the 
Confucian and Mohist disputers of the day could offer – one that might 
be more suitable in conveying truths that constantly spill over and cannot 
be stated directly. In this vein, one might view the  Qíwùlùn chapter itself 
as an extended account of ‘goblet word’ strategy. Angus Graham perhaps 
anticipated such a connection between the  Qíwùlùn , goblet words, and 
the knack passages: 
 For [Zhuangzi] the fundamental error [of his contemporaries] is to 
suppose that life presents itself with issues which must be formulated 
in words so that we can envision alternatives and find reasons for 
preferring one to the other . . . People who really know what they 
are doing, such as a cook carving an ox, or a carpenter or an angler, 
do not precede each movement by weighing the argument . . . “the 
tongue cannot put it into words”. 
 ( Graham 2001 , 6) 
 3.  Conveying What Cannot Be Said and Thick 
Moral Concepts 
 Is there a concept in Western philosophy that is open-ended and dynamic 
enough to apply to Zhuangzi’s goblet words? Perhaps moral thickness 
can answer the brief. Some proponents of morally thick concepts see in 
them a propositionally ineffable content that tends to run through one’s 
fingers and cannot quite be grasped. Taking aesthetic metaphors as his 
leaping off point, Nick Zangwill has argued that the fact-value-bridging 
thick concepts that many theorists have in mind are more easily found 
in colloquial metaphorical language – i.e., in “evaluative animal descrip-
tions, swearwords, and gestures” ( Zangwill 2013 , 201). For example, 
calling someone a ‘chicken’, ‘rat’, or ‘lion’ in English has clear moral 
content, and although other languages have idioms involving these crea-
tures, the metaphorical meanings there are radically different. More 
importantly, while a foreign speaker may learn the proper usage of a 
particular culture’s animal descriptions or swearwords, the attending 
praise or disgust is often felt only faintly. Neuroscientists call this phe-
nomenon  reduced emotional resonance of language and it is one reason 
why most people feel differently about using profanity in their second 
language – either they find it far easier or avoid it altogether because 
they cannot judge the intensity of what they are saying ( Ivaz et al. 2018 ). 
The content such metaphors and idioms express resists propositional 
unpacking and paraphrasing such content likewise strips it of its evalu-
ative import. So, contra Davidson, it appears  certain metaphors are not 
empty, that they convey something that cannot otherwise be said. 19 In 
other words, there appears to be some propositionally ineffable, evalu-
ative content in such metaphors and, contra Allinson and Chong, this 
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content looks to be  non-cognitive , or in the very least accessible only 
through the faculties of ‘hot-cognition’. 
 The  Zhuangzi is chock full of animal descriptions and shocking pro-
fanity that could serve as stellar examples of Zangwill’s point about mor-
ally thick metaphors. Some examples: the text begins with a story about 
an incredibly large fish that transforms into a phoenix-like bird, moving 
from abundant yin to the utmost yang and back again. Zhuangzi himself 
is referred to as a turtle happily dragging its tail in the mud. A friend 
and philosophical rival, Huizi, is likened to a greedy owl protecting a 
meal of rotten rat from an uninterested phoenix. A criminal who is agi-
tated by Confucius’s yammering is called an untamable tiger. And, in the 
22nd chapter, when a Mohist scholar asks Zhuangzi where  dào exists, 
he replies, “There is nowhere that it doesn’t exist . . . It is in the tiles and 
shards . . . It is in the  piss and shit ” [ zaì shĭ nì  在屎溺 ] (tr. Watson 1968, 
241). Another example that has been largely glossed over by translation 
is that of Butcher Ding in the third chapter. His occupation is filthy and 
disgusting, yet he performs his task with such elegance and grace that the 
lord of the estate claims to have learned from him  yāng shēng zhu˘ – i.e., 
“the secret of nourishing life”. 20 In this brief parable, Zhuangzi employs 
the  zhòngyán form of his goblet words and puts the wisdom in the mouth 
and the hands of someone his Confucian and Mohist counterparts would 
have deemed profane. 
 In Kuang-ming Wu’s pioneering essay on Zhuangzi’s goblet words we 
already find a description that anticipates moral thickness: 
 We use a word adverbially when we ourselves move, shifting our 
perspective into the mode of that word. A noun describes a thing.  An 
adverb describes, or even prescribes, a way of life . . .  Chuang Tzu’s 
goblet words are words requesting us to change, to be judged and 
transformed , so that we become as nothing, absolutely nimble and – 
flexing with things. 
 ( Wu 1988 , 2; emphasis added) 
 This emphasis on change, transformation, and personal growth in the 
goblet words is echoed in Daniel Fried’s analysis of the temporality 
imbedded in the way the  Zhuangzi describes them: 
 The  zhiyan is thus being figured as a mode which is ineffably ancient, 
yet fit for commonplace, everyday usage. It is something which is 
unstable, certainly, which owes its essence to a constant tipping and 
consequent overflow – but which is unstable in cycles, and which has a 
rhythmic, eternal quality tied to the cycles of heaven and earth. Day in 
and day out, from the heavenly beginnings to the end of years,  properly 
unstable speech carries the power to irrigate the seeds of the ten thou-
sand things , to cooperate with nature in the metamorphoses of forms. 
 ( Fried 2007 , 168; emphasis added) 
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 The thick moral dimension of Zhuangzi’s words, then, should not be 
seen as directly answering ‘What is the right way to act?’ but rather as 
indirectly guiding us toward the best sort of life. Where the former seeks 
a static, universal rule, the latter seeks dynamic transformation. 
 4. Moral Knack: Listening Without Words 
 If Zhuangzi’s moral ‘reals’ cannot be stated directly, the question remains 
how they could ever guide ethical action. The answer to that question 
might be the second most distinctive feature of a Zhuangzian non-
cognitive moral realism. The foregoing points regarding ineffability, 
attunement, and transformation are important for those who discern a 
kind of ethical prescription from the text’s various moral exemplars – 
particularly those skilled artisans who possess uncanny knack in their 
trade equated with ‘the secret of nourishing life’. This suggests the author(s) 
viewed such values as both real  and attainable, albeit  neither through 
formal discourse  nor lengthy tutelage. These ‘knack passages’, then, may 
be seen to invoke a unique notion of moral  expertise . More importantly, 
when asked about the Way of their technique, these knacky artisans can 
offer demonstration, and some can even talk  about what they do, but 
they are quite at a loss for words when it comes to giving an account of 
the knack itself. 
 As we have seen, the  Zhuangzi’s advice for self-cultivation was set up 
in opposition to the rigid practices of the Confucians and Mohists. As 
such, the attunement the Daoist sage sought is considered formless and 
ever-changing. In this vein, Zhuangzi’s goblet words appear intimately 
connected to the Daoist  wu -forms 21 (or ‘non’ forms), particularly the 
practice of  wúmíng [ 無名 ], or ‘referring without affixing a name’. Again, 
returning to the  Qíwùlùn , we find this discussion initiated not by advice 
about  speaking properly but rather by  listening to the pipes of heaven, 
earth, and humanity. Zhuangzi saw transformation as “the coordinat-
ing of the patterns ( li  理 ) of continuity that emerge and persist in the 
natural, social, and cultural flux in which we are radically and resolutely 
embedded” ( Ames 1998 , 226). In other words, human beings can con-
tribute to the formation of the contexts they inhabit through interaction 
with other contributing factors. If there is anything like our conception 
of knowledge to be distilled from this, it will not be straightforwardly 
cognitive because it involves non-propositional and situational elements 
due to its concomitance with emerging patterns in the world. According 
to Zhuangzi, this kind of transformation can either accord with  dào or 
work against it; it can be either harmonious or cacophonous (cf.  Cook 
2003 ). The individual who could achieve a harmonious transformation is 
Zhuangzi’s ‘person of the dao’, and would be called the  zhēnrén [ 真人 ], 
or ‘genuine person’. 
 Interestingly, the characters presented in the knack passages who pos-
sess a skill supremely attuned to the  dào pay deep attention to the body, 
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not merely to cognition. With regard to the expertise of ‘the craftsman’, 
Richard Sennett has stated, “all skills, even the most abstract, begin as 
bodily practices”, which find  both thinking  and feeling in the process of 
 making ( Sennett 2008 , 10). 22 Sennett makes reference to the ancient art 
of the Chinese cleaver chef, who 
 worked out a different way to use the combined forearm, hand, and 
cleaver in order to cut food finely. . . . The idea of minimum force as 
the base line of self-control is expressed in the apocryphal if perfectly 
logical advice given in ancient Chinese cooking: the good cook must 
learn first to cleave a grain of boiled rice. 
 ( Sennett 2008 , 167) 
 Sennett connects this sort of embodiment to the expert’s virtue of situ-
ational awareness through the Butcher Ding story. 
 “Cleave a grain of rice” thus stands for two bodily rules intimately 
connected: establish a base line of minimum necessary power, and 
learn to let go .  .  . The Chuang-tzu advises, do not behave like a 
warrior in the kitchen, from which Taoism derives a broader ethics 
for  Homo faber : [viz.]  an aggressive, adversarial address to natural 
materials is counterproductive . 
 ( Sennett 2008 , 168; emphasis added) 
 So, the knack craftsmen all appear to be chasing the same thing, i.e., a 
way to attune with “a universe of emergent  situations rather than a uni-
verse of entities located in time, space, and vector motion”, or, in a word, 
 dào ( Eno 1996 , 139; emphasis added). As Butcher Ding puts it, this goes 
a ‘step beyond skill’ [ 進乎技矣 ] or merely using one’s hands effectively. 
The word Butcher Ding uses is  jì [技], which can also be translated as 
‘craft, talent, or ability’, and has a meaning similar to  shù [術], which can 
be translated as ‘artistic avenue/strategy’. In the 19th ( Dáshēng ) chapter, 
Carver Qing claims not to have any ‘artistic avenue’ ( shù ) beyond focus-
ing only on the task at hand. Each craftsman  follows dào but does not 
possess it in such a way that can be put into words. 23 The kinds of prac-
tices that attune to  dào are extremely diverse, yet each shares a stake in 
some larger notion of efficacy. 
 If not yet rising to the level of a full-fledged ethics, the embodied respon-
siveness [ yīng ] and situational awareness [ míng ] of these knacky artisans 
could all be said to offer, in the very least, something of a philosophy of 
action. But this is one reason the concept  zìrán [自然] is so central to get-
ting a handle on the text’s normative themes. As Livia Kohn has put it, 
“Skillful spontaneity, then, means the integration of two abilities: first, to 
correctly read – intuit and interpret – the dynamics of any given situation; 
and second, to act in precise response to it” ( Kohn 2014 , 218). 
15032-3156.indb   170 8/20/2019   6:04:58 PM
Goblet Words and Moral Knack 171
 Reaching such heightened acuity requires a kind of intellectual mod-
esty that allows for adaptability to changing circumstances and there-
fore fosters growth. In this way, the text holds up an ethics of  απορια , 
in which “one acts on the basis of what one  does not know , what one 
cannot control, what one cannot contain, rather than fixed rules, deter-
minate principles, or clear imperatives” ( Lusthaus 2003 , 164). This sort 
of intellectual modesty links up with psychological studies on expertise 
and metacognition. Those who possess expertise in a given field are more 
likely to have a knack for metacognition – the ability to recognize one’s 
own limitations through careful deliberation: “Good singers know when 
they’ve hit a sour note; good directors know when a scene in a play isn’t 
working” ( Nichols 2017 , 45). Or, as Butcher Ding puts it, “whenever I 
come to something intricate, I see where it will be hard to handle and cau-
tiously prepare myself, my gaze settles on it, action slows down for it, you 
scarcely see the flick of the chopper” ( Graham 2001 , 64). Such practical 
wisdom is “based on softness, emptiness, nonaction, and spontaneity” 
and falls under a general heading:  dàoshù , or “ dào strategy” (R.  Wang 
2012 , 127). Thus, the path to moral excellence espoused in the  Zhuangzi 
appears to be a kind of “situational ethics” that “means matching atti-
tudes and actions to situations” ( Kohn 2014 , 237). 
 Experts in various fields also often possess a willingness to bend or 
break rules in service of a higher value. For example, in his 2010 work 
on  Practical Wisdom , Barry Schwartz lauded the efforts of wise public 
schoolteachers to act as “creative saboteurs” in the face of “lockstep 
curricula”  (Schwartz and  Sharpe 2010, 171). Standardization was rob-
bing them of the freedom to pursue this higher value and by choosing 
to not simply go along with the rules these ‘canny outlaws’, as Schwartz 
calls them, modeled for their students the virtue of ethical subversion. 
Like expert jazz musicians, canny outlaws recognize when to ignore the 
rules.  Similarly, throughout the  Zhuangzi there are stories of physically 
deformed figures, particularly disfigured people and crooked trees, who 
bring forth the virtues of the sage precisely because they rest at ease within 
their own unconventional natures – e.g., Huizi’s tree in  Chapter One , the 
Holy-tree and Sage-tree in  Chapter Four , the ‘madman’ Jie Yu and the 
numerous instances of criminal amputees in  Chapter Five . According to 
the  Zhuangzi it is better to have a crippled form than to have one’s vital-
ity crippled by convention. 
 Unfortunately, the models of expertise with which philosophers are 
most familiar tend to run along two problematic lines: intellectualist 
and phronetic ( Jones and Schroeter 2012 ). The former places empha-
sis on professional ethical training while the latter is typically presented 
within a framework of Aristotelean virtue ethics, in which practical wis-
dom ( phronesis ) is paramount. But, recent research indicates that pro-
fessional training in moral philosophy does not reliably make one less 
prone to errors or inconsistencies ( Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012 ). In 
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fact, in certain scenarios, professional training in ethical theory made phi-
losophers  more susceptible to post-hoc rationalizations of their choices. 
As the research team concluded: “even professional philosophers’ judg-
ments about familiar types of cases in their own field can be strongly 
and covertly influenced by psychological factors . . . and [these] can in 
turn strongly influence the general principles which these philosophers 
endorse” ( Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012 , 150). So it would seem the 
intellectualist model of moral expertise has some significant shortcom-
ings. Likewise, traditional phronetic models of moral expertise typi-
cally require some teleological account of the ‘unity of the virtues’ – the 
Aristotelian belief that one cannot have some virtues and not others – a 
longstanding theoretical difficulty among contemporary virtue theorists 
( Jones and Schroeter 2012 , 218). 
 Zhuangzi’s notion of moral knack seems to avoid these pitfalls because 
it does not “share the assumption that expertise is primarily about the 
capacity reliably to deliver action-guiding verdicts that will settle [once 
and for all] what we are to do in particular circumstances” ( Jones and 
Schroeter 2012 , 219). Instead it takes moral judgment as situational, 
tentative, and inherently incomplete, the resulting action-guiding prin-
ciples as emergent, and the moral progress an agent makes in her life as 
non-linear. As such, his conception of moral knack is neither founda-
tionalist nor relativistic and the expertise the knacky artisans display is 
‘domain-limited’. 
 Given that the world of value is complex and the capacities needed 
to navigate in it many and various, it is more realistic to expect that 
such human moral expertise as exists would take patchwork form 
rather than the idealized form hypothesized in the simple statement 
of the [intellectualist and phronetc] models. 
 ( Jones and Schroeter 2012 , 223) 
 Perhaps this could be another way to make sense of the multiplicity of 
efficacious exemplars presented in the text. Since 
 a plausible response to the problem of how to identify who has 
expertise abandons the thought that expertise is shown only or pri-
marily in all-in judgments about rightness and instead looks for more 
piece-meal context dependent expertise with particular thick moral 
concepts. 
 ( Jones and Schroeter 2012 , 219) 
 As I have proposed elsewhere (Kirby 2017), passages like the ones involv-
ing Butcher Ding, Wheelwright Bian, and Carver Qing seem to suggest 
that each has found a unique way to tap into the same sort of expertise – 
i.e., ‘the secret of nourishing life’, or  yăng shēng zhu ˘ – though none can 
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be said to have taken final possession of that expertise. In other words, 
it appears knack is  dào-tracking insofar as it is domain-limited, and the 
strategies it offers must remain indirect and incomplete. In this way, the 
paradox and denegation of Zhuangzi’s goblet words can be tied directly 
to the  wu -forms of Daoist practice. 
 5. In Lieu of a Conclusion 
 In summary, I have tried to show the plausibility of reading the  Zhuangzi 
in terms of non-cognitive moral realism. Key passages in the text suggest 
Zhuangzi believed moral reals (i.e., attitude-independent norms) exist, 
but they are propositionally ineffable because they emerge in a dynamic 
world. Because of this, Zhuangzi employed goblet words as signposts 
pointing to the moral lessons he sought to convey – despite the factual 
inaccuracies of the words themselves. These ‘truths’, which Zhuangzi’s 
goblet words ‘tip toward’, might be accessed non-cognitively through 
attuning with the natural world, listening to one’s body, and refining 
technical skill. The goal of these practices is the transformation of the self 
in harmony with the constant changes of nature – an emergent ‘bringing 
forth’ of normativity that cannot be put into words. 
 Yet the author(s) of the  Zhuangzi could not write a book without 
words. The goblet words of the text, therefore, convey what cannot be 
stated directly by relying on metaphor, allegory, paradox, and denega-
tion. Metaphors,  especially the sort Zhuangzi employed, are powerful 
examples of moral thickness because they resist reduction to morally thin 
concepts. 
 Since they are non-propositional, situational, and open-ended, what is 
grasped through Zhuangzi’s goblet words (and the practices of the knacky 
artisans) appear to correspond with what might be called non-truth-apt 
moral beliefs. But it would be inaccurate to say the  Zhuangzi employed 
metaphor, paradox, and allusion as a ladder to be ‘kicked away’ once the 
desired insights are achieved, since such a ladder would need to extend 
endlessly in order to keep up with a continuously evolving destination. 
In this way, the agent who transforms herself into a sage can be said to 
have ‘listened without words’. For Zhuangzi, this kind of knack is  not a 
matter of epistemic ‘knowing that’ but one of noetic ‘knowing how’. In 
other words, the goal of Daoist  wu -form strategy, which includes the  wú 
míng of Zhuangzi’s goblet words and the  wú wéi of the knack passages is 
not enlightenment but edification – not clarity but growth. Those whose 
growth never ceases may gain expertise in their chosen field and,  ipso 
facto , a glimpse of something larger –  viz . the  dào . 
 However, there are still some difficulties in this realist reading. One 
involves the fact that Zhuangzi does not seem to believe there will be any 
convergence among experts. Moral disagreement is often seen as a strike 
against moral realism. One way of side-stepping the convergence issue 
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might involve highlighting the value pluralism of the  Zhuangzi , which 
holds up numerous forms of life that might be considered equally viable 
candidates for strategically coping with a delusional society. David  Wong 
(1984, 2006 ) uses such a strategy in connection to what he calls plural-
istic relativism: 
 The idea is that once we are able to suspend looking at people through 
our evaluative categories, we will be able to accept them for what they 
are, see them as beings like ourselves, and care for them as we care for 
ourselves. 
 (1984, 208) 
 But perhaps there is a non-relativistic alternative here. A synopsis of the 
 Zhuangzi ’s first two chapter, taken together, might read: 
 Chapter 1 :  There’s all manner of perspectives both large and small, so 
don’t be a tool for someone else. Transform oneself through 
the  wu -forms to discover attunement with the world. 
 Chapter 2 :  While most people can hear things only in their own terms, 
a sage can listen to something on  its own terms . How much 
better would it be to listen without  any terms? If one could 
attain such fine awareness [ 明  míng ] and rich responsiveness 
[ 應  yìng ], it would be like continuously waking from a dream. 
 In this regard, the kind of clarity of vision and effortless action demon-
strated in the  dàoshù ( dào -strategies) of the knack artisans seems indicative 
of an external moral reality, albeit one so complex that different experts 
are attuned to different aspects which explains their non-convergence. As 
the opening passage of the final chapter – itself composed of the  zhòngyán 
style of goblet words – states: 
 天下之治方術者多矣，皆以其有為不可加矣。古之所謂道術者，果惡
乎在？曰：無乎不在 . 
 Many are the  shù of those trying to regulate the whole world, and each 
claims to be something that cannot be improved upon. But, what the 
ancients called  dàoshù , where has it gone?! We say: “It is everywhere”. 
 ( Zhuangzi , Ch. 33) 
 Notes 
 1 . I am indebted to Colin Marshall’s “Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral 
Realism” ( 2017 ) for framing the issue in these terms. 
 2 . I maintain conventions in referring to Zhuang Zhou, the man, as Zhuangzi 
and the text associated with him as the  Zhuangzi . The received version of the 
text is a recension from the Jin dynasty that grouped 33 chapters into ‘inner’ 
(1–7), ‘outer’ (8–22), and ‘miscellaneous’ (23–33). Zhuang Zhou has been 
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traditionally viewed as the author of the inner chapters, while later chapters 
are held to contain the ideas of various sects of his followers. 
 3 . Annas later writes, “The learner in virtue, like the learner in a practical skill, 
needs to understand what she is doing . . . This comes about when the virtue 
is conveyed by the giving and receiving of reasons, in contrast with the non-
rational picking up of a ‘knack’” (Ibid.) 
 4 . It is important to note that empirical studies regarding expertise do not bear 
this out. On the contrary, it seems deliberation occurs early on in the devel-
opment of a skill but falls away at the highest levels of achievement (cf. H. 
 Dreyfus 2014 ). 
 5 . Normally an expert does not calculate. He or she does not solve problems. 
He or she does not even think” (S.  Dreyfus 2004 , 180). 
 6 . The sort of ineffability to which I refer has been called ‘unrepresentability’ by 
Kukla (2004). In the body of the essay, I will use ‘propositionally ineffable’ 
when referring to the sorts of moral truths Zhuangzi sought to convey. 
 7 . Alternatively, there are a handful of authors seeking to coalesce the mystical 
and perspectival elements of the text (cf. Yearley 1982;  Roth 2000 ;  Ziporyn 
2003 ). 
 8 . For more detail on chapter groupings, see Steve Coutinho’s  An Introduction 
to Daoist Philosophies (2013). 
 9 . Moeller and D’Ambrosio write, “It is noteworthy that one of the three occur-
rences in the Daodejing associates it with fluidity or differentiation . . . and 
it is quite conceivable that a correspondingly paradoxical meaning of zhen, 
which takes change and transformation as the basis for genuineness or real-
ness, has informed the terminological creation of zhenren in the Zhuangzi” 
( 2017 , 127–8). 
 10 . The first four characters intend something like a mockery by contrasting 
benevolence with itself ( rén zé rén yĭ ). 
 11 . “ 道惡乎隱而有真偽 ?” “How has the  dào become obscured such that there is 
 zhēn and  wéi ?” 
 12 . As one put it, “No other text of early times . . . so fully exploits the beauties of 
ancient Chinese – its vigor, its economy, its richness and symmetry” ( Watson 
1968 , xxiv). 
 13 . These are variously translated as ‘imputed/lodged/dwelling words’, ‘repeated/
weighty/opalescent words’, and ‘goblet/spillover words’ respectively (cf.  Wu 
1988 ;  Lin 2016 ;  Morrow 2016 ). 
 14 . The first reference to such words appears in what scholars call a ‘school of 
Zhuangzi’ chapter (27). As such, it was likely written shortly after the second 
chapter ( Qíwùlùn ) of the ‘inner chapters’ attributed directly to Zhuangzi (cf. 
 Lin 2016 , 248). Chapter 33 is considered a ‘Syncretist’ chapter and was prob-
ably written some time later. 
 15 . According to André Kukla’s work on ineffability, such open-endedness of lan-
guages should be apparent since, “One can . . . introduce new expressive devices 
into English without its ceasing to be English. Moreover there is no definite, 
sharply marked degree or type of novelty beyond which a linguistic  innovation 
results in our speaking a different language” ( 2004 , 14; emphasis added). 
 16 . Allinson calls it ‘preconceptual cognitive content’ and Chong refers to it as 
‘non-propositional content’. Interestingly, most commentators in the com-
parative literature seem to reject the Davidsonian theories of metaphor and 
translatability. 
 17 . In modern Mandarin  充實  is a combination that indicates ‘rich, full, or substan-
tial’, but in keeping with the metaphor of the tipping goblet, I have translated 
them in their individual meanings, using ‘ever-cascading’ as a metaphorical 
replacement of  chōng , ‘to fill; full; to substitute; replace’, and using ‘truth’ to 
stand for the ‘real, honest, true’ meaning of  shí . 
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 18 . Much of the argument for understanding Zhuangzi in these terms draws 
upon a reading of Daoism which could be called the focus-field model estab-
lished by Ames and Hall in their translation of the writings of Laozi titled 
 Dao De Jing: Making This Life Significant (2003). 
 19 . Zhuangzi may have agreed with Davidson that “Words are the wrong cur-
rency to exchange for a picture” (1978, 46–7). But Zhuangzi would have 
seen this as a problem for words, not pictures. As Kukla rightly points out, 
“Davidson thinks that the notion of an inexpressible feature of the world 
is empty. But that is what he’s supposed to be proving as a consequence of 
the translatability thesis. My point is that the argument begs the question” 
( Kukla 2004 , 35; emphasis added). 
 20 . As Edward Slingerland points out, “Zhuangzi was hanging out in woodshops 
and kitchens . . . [and] [t]his world revealed to him artisans and butchers, ferry-
man and draftsman, whose effortless ease and responsiveness to the world could 
serve as a model for his disaffected fellow intellectuals” ( Slingerland 2014 , 143). 
 21 . As Roger Ames and David Hall have noted, “In Confucianism, self is deter-
mined by sustained effort in deferential transactions guided by ritually struc-
tured roles and relations that project one’s person outward into society and 
into culture. . . . Daoism, on the other hand, expresses its deferential activity 
through what [are called] the wu-forms. The three most familiar articula-
tions of this pervasive sensibility are:  wuwei ,  wuzhi , and  wuyu . These are, 
respectively, non-coercive actions in accordance with the de of things; a sort 
of knowing without resort to rules or principles; and a desiring which does 
not seek to control its ‘object’” ( 2003 , 38). 
 22 . Among the numerous studies and examples Sennett offers to support his the-
sis is research on attention deficit disorder and expertise. Contra prevail-
ing presuppositions about leading students to attention through emotional 
investment and entertainment, research indicates the inverse to be true – viz. 
that emotional investment and enjoyment actually follow from the acquisi-
tion and refinement of the skill in question (cf.  Sennett 2008 , 172). 
 23 . Compare this with other stories from the  Dáshēng – the cicada catcher and 
the old swimmer – to see further diversity in explanations. One claims to 
have a  dào [ yǒu dào 有道], the other says he has none [ wú dào 無道]. 
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